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IREDELL RECLAIMED: FAREWELL TO SNOWISS’S HISTORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
GERALD L EONARD∗
An unfortunate distortion has crept into the recent historiography
of judicial review. This distortion is not the doing of Larry Kramer, the
honoree of this symposium, but his accomplished history of the origins
of judicial review does its little bit to perpetuate it. I refer to the idea
that the early theorists of judicial review saw that practice as
distinctively “political-legal”1 or a “substitute for revolution,” 2 rather
than a straightforwardly legal or purely judicial practice. The modern
source of this idea is Sylvia Snowiss’s influential book, Judicial Review
and the Law of the Constitution. 3 Snowiss argues that virtually no one
thought of the Constitution as a source of judicially expoundable law
until well into the nineteenth century, after some decades of John
Marshall’s working his magic on the United States Supreme Court.
The political scientist Dean Alfange methodically exposed many of
Snowiss’s misreadings of evidence and corrected her major claims
shortly after the book’s publication, 4 but that review has had
surprisingly little effect. Scholars have continued to echo Snowiss’s
argument right through to the present and even, as in Kramer’s case,
when their own arguments need not rely on any of Snowiss’s claims.5 I
will not recapitulate Alfange’s article here, but I do want to correct a
part of Snowiss’s book that Alfange ignored and that Kramer implicitly
endorses: Snowiss’s treatment of James Iredell of North Carolina, the
man widely regarded as the most compelling early theorist of judicial
∗ Professor, Boston University School of Law. Ph.D., 1992; J.D., 1995, University of Michigan.
My thanks to Mary Bilder for comments on this essay, to all the symposium participants for intellectual
stimulation, and especially to Dan Hamilton for a uniformly great event.
1. LARRY D. KRAMER , THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 63 (2004).
2. SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 50 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of Judicial Review: In
Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 329, 333–49 (1993).
5. In addition to Kramer, see, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Thayerian Deference to Congress and
Supreme Court Supermajority Rule: Lessons from the Past, 78 IND. L.J. 73, 80–81 (2003); William R.
Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 CONN. L. REV. 329 (1995);
Matthew P. Harrington, Judicial Review Before John Marshall, 72 G EO. WASH. L. REV. 51, 88 (2003);
Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John Marshall’s Judicial Statesmanship, 37
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 405 (2004); Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Judicial Review Revisited, or
How the Marshall Court Made More out of Less, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 787 (1999). Harrington’s
momentary echoing of Snowiss is especially perplexing because he otherwise offers a sensible
reading of Iredell not so different from my own.

review. This essay is meant to reclaim what I think is the proper and
simple meaning of Iredell’s work from Snowiss’s needless complications.
In the process, perhaps it can reinforce Alfange’s more general effort to
correct Snowiss’s distortion of the early history of judicial review.
I will take the first few pages below to criticize Kramer just a bit but
mostly to critique Snowiss’s book. Then I will spend the balance of the
essay explicating Iredell’s famous 1786 essay “T o the Public.” My
reading of Iredell will echo some traditional views of his work, clearing
away what I think are Snowiss’s distortions, and then I will add what I
hope are some original insights into the meaning of his work.
I.

KRAMER AND SNOWISS

Kramer rightly attributes to Iredell the “most thoughtful
presentation of this new principle,” the principle that courts might be
relied on for “constitutional enforcement.” 6 He then goes on to offer a
characteristically sensible reading of Iredell’s famous essay, “To the
Public,” in which he emphasizes Iredell’s premise that the judiciary, the
same as the legislature, acted as the people’s constitutional agent and
thus was required to implement only constitutional statutes.7 So far, so
good. But I lose Kramer when he says that judicial review was therefore
understood by Iredell and his like as a substitute for revolution: “Judicial
review, in other words, was not an act of ordinary legal interpretation.
It was a political—perhaps we should say a ‘political-legal’—act of
resistance.” 8 Of course, there is a grain of truth in this characterization,
in the sense that all authorized acts of government are substitutes for
revolution; if the sovereign people did not have their three branches
exercising their delegated powers, they would be left to a sort of
permanent state of revolution. But there is not much indication in
Iredell’s essay that he thought judicial review “political-legal” rather
than just “legal”—a straightforward judicial exercise of the
constitutional authority delegated to that branch. 9
Happily, not much in Kramer’s argument actually rides on the
suggestion that Iredell thought judicial review “political-legal.” His more
general history of the early, extrajudicial development of American
6. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 60.
7. Id. 60–63.
8. Id. at 63.
9. Kramer inserted into the argument a nice quotation from the early case of Trevett v.
Weeden, which serves him comparatively well, at least better than Iredell’s essay does, but that
doesn’t much affect my point. See id. at 63 (citing JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST
W EEDEN 26 (Providence, John Carter 1787)).
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constitutionalism stands strong, leaving this distortion of Iredell as a
somewhat marginal mischaracterization. For Snowiss, however, on
whom Kramer relies only for this section, the distortion of Iredell
played an important and telling role.
Snowiss sought to show that, before Marshall, judicial review was
not thought a matter of applying law at all, at least not in any
conventional sense. For her, Iredell’s argument is neatly of a piece with
what she calls “period 2” judicial review, characterized by the notion
that the judiciary should never expound but only notice the
Constitution, exercising review only as the first line of revolutionary
resistance; judicial review was an act of political resistance—not legal
interpretation—by men who just happened to be judges, compelled to
come face to face with a legislative usurpation. 10 If they refused to
apply a statute to a case on constitutional grounds, it was not because
they had carefully expounded the law of the Constitution and found it to
preclude implementation of the statute at issue. Rather, barred from
expounding the Constitution at all, the judges could refuse to implement
a statute only when the legislative act flouted the Constitution so
flagrantly that its usurping character could be seen by all without the
least need for constitutional interpretation. 11
This version of judicial review directly implied, for Snowiss, the
“doubtful case rule,” the rule that declared the judiciary’s unwillingness
to strike down a statute in any but the clearest cases of
unconstitutionality. 12 This rule was frequently endorsed then (and more
even today than is normally recognized13), but it was rarely, if ever,
explained by the judges and often ignored.14 For Snowiss, the rule was
merely a corollary of the assumption that judicial review was political
rather than legal. If judges could not construe or expound the
Constitution (a legal activity), but could refuse to implement statutes
only when necessary as an act of political resistance, then such an act—
open resistance to constituted authority—could only be justified in such
clear cases of usurpation as would justify any faithful citizen’s
resistance. 15

10. See, e.g., SNOWISS, supra note 2, at, 73–74.
11. Id. at 45–89.
12. Id. at 63–65.
13. See Caminker, supra note 5, at 85–86.
14. For examples, see the line of Pennsylvania cases endorsing the rule with little explanation:
Moore v. Houston, 3 Serg. & Rawle 169, 178 (Pa. 1817); Commonwealth ex rel. O’Hara v. Smith, 4
Binn. 117, 126 (Pa. 1811); Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416, 423 (Pa. 1808); Respublica v. Duquet, 2
Yeates 493, 498 (Pa. 1799).
15. SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 63–65.
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Snowiss’s argument is clever, but there is an alternative and much
simpler version of the early history. It is that judicial review rapidly
gained adherents by force of the legal logic of the Revolution, not by
the positing of some extra-legal, quasi-revolutionary role for the judges.
As the fundamental transition from legislative to popular sovereignty
began to be understood,16 the legal logic of judicial review became quite
powerful, although never, of course, unanswerable. The new American
constitutions abandoned the legislative sovereignty that had made
judicial review unthinkable (more or less17) under the English
“constitution.” With sovereignty removed to the people, there was no
necessary reason why the legislatures should be immune to the
judiciary’s coordinate review, although new arguments against judicial
review would emerge in due course.18 Of course, there was a political
aspect to such legal arguments as there is to every legal argument. But
Iredell’s articulated claims for judicial review were just the sort of legal
and judicial arguments later made by Marshall and others and generally
taught in law schools today; they did not justify the practice in political
terms or in terms of revolutionary action but simply as a product of the
legal logic of popular sovereignty. As I will argue below, Iredell actually
contended that constitutional review grew more or less naturally out of
the judicial office, out of the most pedestrian, uncontroversial
understanding of a judge’s work. He did not fail to see what was special
about this aspect of judging: that it was bound to attract much more
attention from the political branches than would most judicial actions.
But that did not alter his view that constitutional review lay necessarily
within the responsibilities of a judge as a matter of simple, honest, legal
reasoning, not as a matter of political calculation nor implied by the
right of revolution.
Before developing Iredell’s positive argument, though, I want to
explain the problems with Snowiss’s use of evidence. Analyzing Iredell’s
16. The standard and definitive study is GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776–1787 (1969).
17. Curiously, Iredell himself resists the weight of modern constitutional historiography by
suggesting that, although contrary to the general principles of the English constitution, even English
judges claimed they could control Parliament when a statute conflicted with “natural justice.” See
Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF
JAMES IREDELL 172, 172 (Griffith J. McRee ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1858) [hereinafter
LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE].
18. The most thorough and powerful argument against judicial review in the early republic,
although it failed completely in the end, was that of Pennsylvania’s Justice John Gibson, dissenting in
Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 343–58 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting). Other resistance to
and arguments against judicial review from the period are collected in RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE
J EFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE YOUNG REPUBLIC (1971); KRAMER, supra note 1,
at 65–72, 145–56; DONALD F. MELHORN, JR., “LEST W E BE MARSHALL ’D”: JUDICIAL POWERS AND
POLITICS IN OHIO, 1806–1812 (2003).
4

public letter, Snowiss points to the “core of Iredell’s defense of judicial
authority over legislation” and acknowledges that one “could easily”
read it “as part of a single line of reasoning leading to Marbury and the
doctrine we accept today.”19 After all, Iredell took it for granted that
“the constitution is a law of the State,” in the same way “as an act of
Assembly,” except that the Assembly may repeal the latter but not the
former. 20 More or less innovative at the time, 21 that reasoning became
very familiar very quickly and remains so today. 22 The Constitution was
just like a statute, a “law of the state,” except that it happened to be
superior, controlling law, much as a later statute controls an earlier
statute. 23
But Snowiss asserts that Iredell, understood in proper historical
context, meant something different—that judges must take notice of
the Constitution but never treat it as they would ordinary law by
actually interpreting it. 24 Iredell never suggests this latter limitation on
constitutional review in any way in his argument, but Snowiss resorts to
this quotation from the essay: “ The great argument [against judicial
review] is, that though the Assembly have not a right to violate the
constitution, yet if they in fact do so, the only remedy is,
either . . . petition . . . or . . . universal resistance.” 25 Snowiss seems to
imply that Iredell’s choice of the phrase “in fact” somehow suggested
that he excluded from judicial review those cases where the legal
meaning of the Constitution would actually need expounding, and
19. SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 49.
20. Id. at 48 (quoting James Iredell, To the Public (1786), in LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE, supra
note 17, at 145, 148).
21. Iredell’s essay is generally thought foundational, but it did not come out of thin air. Willis
Whichard, for example, notes that Iredell’s friend and mentor, Samuel Johnston, had put similar
arguments on paper a few years earlier. See WILLIS P. WHICHARD, JUSTICE JAMES IREDELL 12
(2000). And Mary Sarah Bilder argues convincingly that the judicial role in reviewing statutes for
repugnancy to constitutions was widely presumed well before Iredell wrote. Bilder, The Corporate
Origins of Judicial Review (forthcoming, Yale Law Journal, 2006). Moreover, while admitting to
Spaight that many people shared an opposition to the practice, Iredell believed that, “Most of the
lawyers . . . are of my opinion . . . “ Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight, supra note 17, at
176.
22. See Marshall’s famous passage in Marbury, noting that “[t]he question, whether an act,
repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to the
United States; but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest.” Marshall goes on, of
course, to argue simply that the Constitution is law, just as a statute is, but that the Constitution is
superior in authority, just like Iredell’s argument. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–80
(1803). As William Nelson argues, that part of Marshall’s opinion raised little excitement at the time,
and, of course, it remains a standard citation for the legitimacy and logic of judicial review today.
SeeWILLIAM E. N ELSON, MARBURY V. M ADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2000).
23. Iredell, supra note 20, at 148.
24. SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 51.
25. Id. at 48 (quoting Iredell, supra note 20, at 147).
5

included only those where the obvious popular meaning of the
Constitution—the “in fact” of constitutional meaning?—rendered a
statute unconstitutional.26 Her other source of comfort is that Iredell
worked off a case—a denial of jury trial—in which the
unconstitutionality was indeed, she thinks, so clear as to obviate all
interpretive activity. 27 But the obviousness of that case—if it was so—
hardly alters the apparent meaning of Iredell’s characterization of the
Constitution as a “law of the state,” judicially cognizable like any other
law of the state. Nor does Iredell’s use of the merely intensifying phrase
“in fact.” Snowiss nevertheless asserts without evidence that, for Iredell,
“[e]nforcement of fundamental law was a political act, a peaceful
substitute for revolution presented as a superior alternative to petition
or universal resistance,” 28 not the straightforward application of law
that Iredell’s language seems to imply. She rightly suggests that nothing
in Iredell implied that judges had exclusive control over the
Constitution. 29 But that is irrelevant to the claim that Iredell justified
judicial review only as an act of political resistance.
The odd, forced character of Snowiss’s reading of Iredell continues
with her recognition that Iredell derived the power of judicial review
specifically from the judges’ obligation to decide lawsuits, the core of
(apolitical) judicial power. To decide cases, of course, the judge had to
figure out how any ostensibly applicable laws (cases, statutes,
constitutional provisions) actually interacted to produce a governing
rule for the case at hand. Presumably, this obligation would entail
interpreting all the plausibly applicable laws. Snowiss recognizes that
that is true of sub-constitutional law,30 and Iredell never suggested
otherwise for constitutional law. But Snowiss just asserts that,
“Restriction of judicial review to a lawsuit underscored the point that
[judicial review] grew out of the judiciary’s exclusive responsibility to
expound ordinary law.”31 It is hard to see why she decides to insert the
adjective “ordinary” here; Iredell never used that adjective or any
equivalent. Why did she not say instead that judicial review grew out of
the judge’s obligation to apply all relevant law, “ordinary” or
constitutional, and thus to expound all of that law in order to decide the
cases? Certainly, that is the easiest understanding of Iredell.

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 50.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 50–51.
Id. at 53.
Id. (emphasis added).
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At the risk of straying beyond my topic, I might observe that
Snowiss’s forced readings continue with a discussion of St. George
Tucker’s opinion in Kamper v. Hawkins.32 In rhetoric much like
Iredell’s, Tucker explicitly identified the Constitution as “the first law of
the land” and therefore pertinent whenever the judiciary must “expound
what the law is. . . . [H]ow can any just exposition be made, if that which
is the supreme law of the land be withheld from [the judges’] view?” 33
The natural reading of this passage, of course, is that Tucker, as a judge,
must expound all the plausibly applicable law—cases, statutes,
constitutions—to figure out “what the law is” that will govern the
case.34 Tucker could have gone on to say that he meant only subconstitutional law when he said “law,” except that he had already
identified the Constitution itself as “the first law of the land” and did
not suggest that he meant to distinguish it from other sorts of “law”
except in terms of hierarchical position. Snowiss was kind enough to do
it for him, though, inserting “ordinary” as a qualifier of law where
Tucker had not. 35
The one consideration I can imagine that could make Snowiss’s
argument plausible is that the exposition of cases and statutes might not
have seemed as readily the joint property of the three branches as the
development of constitutional law did. Perhaps that would serve to limit
Iredell’s and the judiciary’s understanding of the scope of permissible
judicial review. But it is easy enough to make the argument that every
branch must expound ordinary law in carrying out its duties in the same
way it must expound constitutional law. More importantly, Tucker and
Iredell simply did not employ this line of reasoning or articulate the
distinction that Snowiss asserts.
II. IREDELL ’S ESSAY
Contrary to Snowiss’s account of Iredell, I think the easy and
natural reading of Iredell is that a judge should act exactly as a judge:
applying the operative law as he understands it. Even more than today
(a few modern ultra-formalists aside), constitutional thinkers in the
founding years worried obsessively about the problem of distinguishing
between legislative and judicial (and executive) power. Resistance to
judicial review in the 1780s often rested on the grounds that to void a

32.
33.
34.
35.

3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20 (1793).
Id. at 78–81.
SNOWISS, supra note 2, at 54 (quoting Tucker’s opinion in Kamper, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) at 78).
Id. at 55.
7

statute was to perform a legislative rather than a judicial act. 36 Iredell
argued instead that refusal to implement a legislative act on
constitutional grounds was a strictly judicial act.
He began with a vigorous rehearsal of the basic principle of
American constitutionalism: that the power of the legislature to make
laws extended just as far as “the deliberate voice of the people,”
manifested in the constitution, had determined it should and no
farther. 37 Specifically, the people of North Carolina, like those of every
other state, had revolted against “the omnipotent power of the British
Parliament” and would then “have been guilty of the basest breach of
trust, as well as the grossest folly, if in the same moment . . . we had
established a despotic power among ourselves.”38 On this point, he
expected no controversy. All agreed that “the power of the Assembly is
limited and defined by the constitution,” that “the Assembly have not a
right to violate the constitution.” 39 There remained disagreement,
however, on the question of what was to be done when the Assembly “in
fact do so.”40 Iredell’s own answer, of course, was that judicial review
must play at least an important part. But he first had to dispose of
“[t]he great argument” that the only options were the leftovers of
British Whig constitutionalism, “a humble petition that the law may be
repealed, or a universal resistance of the people,” leaving the
Assembly’s ostensible “law” to control the judges in the meantime. 41
The first of these Lockean 42 options he deemed an absurdity in a
system where the people, not the legislature, were sovereign. In
England, a people’s petition with appropriate marks of humility might
be the only legal alternative to revolutionary upheaval. But the point of
the Revolution, as Iredell had made clear in his preamble, was to remove
sovereignty—the ultimate lawmaking authority—from the legislature to
the people. In America, it was entirely within the people’s legal rights
to disregard an unconstitutional law and entirely inappropriate for them
to petition their inferiors in the lawmaking process.
So, as a practical matter, what were the people to do? What, to put
it another way, had their constitutions already marked out as the
remedy in such a circumstance? Yes, the “whole people may resist”
when necessary. But that was neither a practical remedy nor,
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 1, at 58.
Iredell, supra note 20, at 145–47.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 146–47.
Id. at 147.
Id.
See Casto, supra note 5, at 334.
8

consequently, the one that the people themselves had chosen. Not only
was universal resistance a “dreadful expedient,” but even the most
flagrantly unconstitutional measures would not engender it as long as
their ill effects stung only a minority, as long as they fell short of
“universal oppression.” Iredell observed that “[a] thousand injuries may
be suffered, and many hundreds ruined, before this can be brought
about.”43 Certainly, the people had not chosen an enforcement
mechanism that must necessarily leave a thousand usurpations
unredressed.
In subsequent paragraphs, Iredell continued to develop the
absurdities of universal resistance as an enforcement measure, but only
as a prelude to his main theoretical point: such a Lockean right of
revolution, like the alternative of a humble petition to the legislature,
belonged to the abandoned constitution of England, not to the
constitutions adopted since the Revolution. Reliance on “universal
resistance,” he said, “is evidently derived from the principle of
unbounded legislative power, that I have noticed before, and that our
constitution reprobates. . . . As little, I trust, is the government of Great
Britain to influence in other things, equally inconsistent with our
condition, and equally preposterous as these.”44 That is, the whole
notion of universal resistance as a device for the enforcement of justice
came from Britain and from the prior British assumption that
sovereignty lay in the legislature, an assumption foreign to the
American system. So the difficulty was not just a matter of the
practicalities of enforcement but a matter of proper interpretation of
the people’s revolutionary history and their choice to implement their
newly won sovereignty in a constitution of separated, delegated, limited
powers.
Finally, in a subsequent letter to Richard Spaight, then sitting as a
member of the 1787 Convention, Iredell acknowledged that frequent
elections might prove a valuable enforcement mechanism for the
people’s constitution. But even Spaight, an opponent of judicial review,
had despaired of the adequacy of elections. So Iredell deemed them
of very little consequence, because this would only secure the views of a
majority; whereas every citizen in my opinion should have a surer pledge
for his constitutional rights than the wisdom and activity of any
occasional majority of his fellow-citizens, who, if their own rights are in
fact unmolested, may care very little for his. 45

43. Iredell, supra note 20, at 147.
44. Id. at 147–48.
45. Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight, supra note 17, at 175.
9

This passage brings out Iredell’s special sensitivity to the problem of
individual rights, which reinforced the idea that the Constitution needed
the judiciary to expound its meaning, not just popular majorities. But it
also remained consistent with his understanding of the Constitution as a
matter of popular sovereignty. Elections might be perfectly appropriate
enforcement mechanisms under a popular constitution, but they were
far from perfect expressions of the abiding constitutional will of the
people, and in any case there was no reason to think elections the
exclusive mechanism.
Once more, then, Iredell returned to the question of what the
constitution did contemplate as an enforcement mechanism and, more
particularly, “whether the judicial power hath any authority to interfere
in [a constitutional] case.”46 When so put, the answer seemed obvious
(even if in these early days few had “extended their ideas” to all the
nuances of judicial review47 under popular sovereignty). After all, the
“duty of [the judicial] power . . . is to decide according to the laws of the
State.”48 And, “[i]t will not be denied, I suppose, that the constitution is
a law of the State” just like “an act of Assembly, with this difference
only, that it is the fundamental law, and unalterable by the legislature,
which derives all its powers from it.” 49 For Snowiss, the adjective
“fundamental” imports something irreducibly political that makes the
law of the Constitution immune to judicial interpretation, but Iredell
explained the significance of a law’s being “fundamental” quite
differently and quite explicitly. For him, in the context of a lawsuit, the
“only” difference between “fundamental law” and “an act of Assembly”
was the former’s hierarchical superiority, such that the latter could not
be taken by a judge to control his decision in the face of contrary
constitutional law. The point became all the more unmistakable by
virtue of Iredell’s analogizing it to the problem of conflicting statutes.
Faced with clashing statutes, the judge simply had to determine which
one controlled the case, the judicial rule generally being that the later
statute would control. A constitutional case presented an analogous
instance of conflicting laws and was resolvable by a different but
analogous rule: constitutional law controls statutory law.
The argument did not rest on an idea that “fundamental” law was
somehow “political” rather than ordinarily legal, nor on the idea that
46.
47.
(1782)).
48.
49.

Iredell, supra note 20, at 148.
See KRAMER, supra note 1, at 62 (quoting Commonwealth v. Caton, 8 Va. (4 Call) 5, 17
Iredell, supra note 20, at 148.
Id.
10

judges might serve as a revolutionary avant-garde. Rather, it rested
simply and clearly on an understanding of judicial power within a
popular constitution: “The judges, therefore, must take care at their
peril, that every act of Assembly they presume to enforce is warranted
by the constitution, since if it is not, they act without lawful authority.
This is not a usurped or a discretionary”—read “political”—“power, but
one inevitably resulting from the constitution of their office, they being
judges for the benefit of the whole people, not mere servants of the
Assembly.”50 In short, the judges must decide cases—their
characteristically judicial function—according to state law, not least the
controlling law of the people’s constitution, and so they could hardly
avoid engaging in constitutional review whenever a litigant raised a
constitutional question. Snowiss’s contrary position may have been
taken by someone at the time, but Iredell at least treated “fundamental”
law as entirely “ordinary”—and thus presumably subject to
interpretation by judges—in all respects except its hierarchical
superiority to statute law.51
It may be worth observing in this connection that Iredell also
seems to have assumed a fairly broad scope for judicial review, not one
overly cramped by fears that the power was an extra-judicial one. For
example, historians have sometimes thought that the early practice of
judicial review was meant to extend no further than the judiciary’s
defense of its own constitutional “rights”—language that might suggest
a very narrow power in no way comparable to later judicial review’s
concern with constitutional rights more generally. 52 But Iredell pretty
clearly indicated a broad power of review, not unlike the modern
practice. For him, the issue was explicitly the rights of individual
50. Id.
51. Iredell immediately went on to reply to several anticipated objections. First, he pointed out
that the de facto dependency of the judges on legislative good will for retention of their offices and
salaries made the judicial power of constitutional review no serious threat to the legislature’s own
rights. In fact, the judiciary probably remained too dependent to carry out all its functions with
sufficient impartiality. Second, anticipating arguments that took Iredell’s apparently departmentalist
position to an extreme (for a modern example of extreme departmentalism, see Michael Stokes
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 G EO. L.J. 217
(1994)), he seemed to implicitly accept that the executive, too, must have a power of considering the
constitutionality of any acts it was asked to perform by other branches. But he rejected the idea that
the executive might reconsider the judiciary’s judgments. Because “the power of judging rests with the
courts,” the sheriff “and other ministerial officers” must accept those judgments and carry out their
offices accordingly. Iredell, supra note 20, at 149. Presumably, although Iredell did not elaborate, the
sheriff might, in effect, review a judicial order that impinged on executive power, such as the
decision precisely how he would enforce a judgment, but he could not reconsider a “judicial”
judgment in a case any more than a court could reconsider a legislative policy choice made within
constitutional bounds.
52. See, e.g., William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455,
470 (2005).
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citizens, not just those of the judiciary as such. And his quite explicit
focus on judicial protection for the legal rights of the individual was
entirely consistent with Kramer’s and William Treanor’s 53
demonstrations that the pattern of early judicial review included many
cases that had little to do with the judiciary’s own rights—that is, little
to do with questions of judicial process or even jury rights.
Not only does Iredell’s argument help bury the idea that early
judicial review was narrowly about the judiciary’s own rights, but his
precise language helps explain the true meaning of the sources that have
suggested that supposition. What did James Wilson and others mean
when they said that the judiciary must have the power of “defending
their constitutional rights”?54 Iredell said that the judges act “at their
peril” if they fail to ensure the constitutionality of every statute they
enforce, lest they find themselves coercing litigants “without lawful
authority.” 55 He thereby reminded the judges that, should legal
authorization be lacking, their every coercion of a litigant was itself a
violation of the law. To hide behind the legislature’s mere assertion that
it had enacted a law, notwithstanding its actual unconstitutionality, was
to act in both a cowardly and an illegal fashion. I think it is easy
enough, then, to see how the exercise of judicial review could be
understood as the defense of a judicial “right” to exercise only judicial
power and not to be reduced to a slave of a usurping legislature. The
defense of the judge’s own liberty and dignity--the judiciary’s own
rights--thus became equivalent to the defense of every individual’s
liberty and dignity, every individual’s constitutional rights.
Finally, conspicuously missing from Iredell’s pathbreaking
argument for judicial review was any mention of the doubtful case rule,
the corollary of Snowiss’s political theory of period 2 judicial review.
Kramer suggests that Iredell’s (and others’) later embrace of the rule
should be understood as a “logical corollary” of the rationale for judicial
review itself,56 but I don’t think so. The logic of Iredell’s argument, in
fact, might well suggest de novo review of constitutionality for several
reasons: the Constitution’s status as paramount law presumably called
for it to have its full scope rather than contracting before the inferior
law of the legislature; Iredell treated the Constitution simply as ordinary
(though paramount) law, fully within judicial competence; and even
53. Id. at 498–503, 541–46.
54. See id. at 470 (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 73 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911)).
55. Iredell, supra note 20, at 148.
56. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 65.
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practical considerations suggested that the real danger lay in usurpations
by legislative majorities rather than by too bold judicial use of
constitutional review.57 But Iredell simply did not consider the issue
until responding to objections from a correspondent the following year,
and that delay is important.
In 1787, a three-judge panel in Bayard v. Singleton vindicated
Iredell’s argument for judicial review and invalidated the statute at
issue.58 Writing to Iredell from Philadelphia that August, where he
represented North Carolina in the Constitutional Convention, Richard
Dobbs Spaight objected vigorously to the judges’ action. 59 He must not
have known Iredell’s position on the matter, because he walked right
into Iredell’s previous arguments as if he had never heard them before.
Denying that there was “any thing in the Constitution, either directly
or impliedly, that will support them, or give them any color of right to
exercise that authority” and decrying the absurdity of any judiciary’s
having “an absolute negative on the proceedings of the Legislature,” he
complained that the judges’ exercise of constitutional review “united in
their own persons the legislative and judiciary powers, which no
monarch in Europe enjoys.”60 Spaight did not doubt the legislature’s
tendency to enact oppressive and unconstitutional measures, but he
could not conceive that judicial review, an innovation that was
“contrary to the practice of all the world”—as if popular sovereignty
were not—might be the answer. He saw the state constitution’s
provision for annual elections as the only remedy, although he
acknowledged its inadequacies.61
There are, of course, weighty arguments for Spaight’s bottom line.
But Spaight, at this point, had not grappled with Iredell’s more
sophisticated arguments for judicial review as a vindication of the
separation of powers. He remained stuck on the idea that it was instead
a violation of that principle, a consolidation of “the legislative and
judiciary powers.” Older models of sovereignty persisted in Spaight’s
mind as they did in the minds of so many who nominally embraced
popular sovereignty but translated that principle immediately into a de
facto legislative sovereignty. 62 That translation rested on the
legislature’s status as the branch closest to the people, but it also rested,
57. Iredell, supra note 20, at 148–49.
58. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787).
59. Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 17, at 168, 169.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 169–70.
62. Cf. KRAMER, supra note 1, at 58–59.
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intentionally or not, on the heritage of legislative sovereignty that had
provided Americans with their main model of governance. Iredell tried
to point out that the Revolution and the subsequent years of
constitution-making had rejected the heritage of parliamentary
sovereignty in favor of an entirely new set of principles that could not
be informed by simple importation of “the practice of all the world.” 63
But even Founders like Spaight were having trouble with the new
principles.
In any case, Iredell responded to Spaight mainly with a reiteration
of the points made in his newspaper essay but also with several
important additional nuances touching on the doubtful case rule. First,
he made all the more explicit his contention that judicial review, far
from being an exercise of legislative power, was inevitably implied in
any exercise of judicial power: because the Constitution was a
“funda mental law, and a law in writing . . . , the judicial power, in the
exercise of their authority, must take notice of it as the groundwork of
that as well as of all other authority.” It simply made no sense for the
judges, as the people’s agents, to attempt to enforce a law “to
which . . . the people owe no obedience.” And he emphasized that this
judicial power did not elevate the judiciary above the legislature by
giving the former a free-ranging, political power to review the latter’s
work. “It is not that the judges are appointed arbiters, and to determine
as it were on any application, whether the Assembly have or have not
violated the Constitution; but when an act is necessarily brought in
judgment before them, they must, unavoidably, determine one way or
another.” 64 Here, as in his essay, Iredell offered a logic that suggested
not a rule of deference to the legislature but full judicial power over
constitutional meaning just insofar as the constitution bore on the
outcome of a litigation.
But, second, out of nowhere, Iredell did produce and embrace a
doubtful case rule. Having noted again the inevitability of judicial review
and the unlikelihood of its abuse, he suddenly observed that “[i]t is a
subject indeed of great magnitude, and I heartily lament the occasion for
its discussion. In all doubtful cases, to be sure, the Act ought to be
supported: it should be unconstitutional beyond dispute before it is
pronounced such.”65 Why? He had previously acknowledged that the
power of judicial review, like any power, was susceptible to abuse, and
63. Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell, supra note 59, at 169.
64. Letter from James Iredell to Richard Spaight, supra note 17, at 173 (containing all the
quotations cited in this paragraph).
65. Id. at 175.
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that “in a doubtful matter [the danger of abuse] may be of great
weight.” 66 But, rather than derive a general rule of restraint from that
susceptibility to abuse, he went on to show how little susceptibility there
really was, largely because of the judiciary’s de facto dependence on the
legislature.67 Then, when he did endorse a doubtful case rule in these
remarks to Spaight, he rested simply on the concession that the whole
subject was of “great magnitude.” I can only read this as a practical
concession to win over an opponent. He understood that, although most
lawyers saw the issue as he did, “many [non-lawyers] think as you
[Spaight] do upon this subject,” and so he offered up a doubtful case
limitation. He thus implied that the judges should not use the power
very aggressively lest they face the sorts of political consequences that
he had described in explaining their dependency on the legislature. To
Spaight, he was saying that the judges’ dependency rendered them safer
than Spaight supposed—probably too safe for the just protection of
individual rights—and that in any case the judges should and would
restrict themselves to very clear cases. To himself, he was making the
merely pragmatic argument that the judges might best reserve the power
for the clearest cases until the public had come around to the
inevitability of judicial review. To that end, perhaps the judges should
only fire when broad political support might be expected. Conspicuously
lacking was any basis for deference in the principles of separation of
powers and popular sovereignty that had driven his argument for judicial
review in the first place.
CONCLUSION
To understand the early days of judicial review accurately, it is
important to see that Iredell’s foundational argument was a
straightforward explication of a change in the location of sovereignty
and its legal implications. The transition from British, Lockean, Whig
constitutional theory, locating sovereignty in the legislature, to
American constitutional theory, locating sovereignty in the people,
impelled a shift in the relations between legislative and judicial power.
The central implication for the courts was that they could no longer
hide behind legislative authority; the legislature was no longer sovereign
and could neither immunize nor coerce the judges, except as authorized
by the people themselves. The judiciary now had to ensure its own
authority to act—protect its own “rights”--by reference to the people’s
66. Id. at 173–74.
67. Id. at 175.
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constitutions. It had to intervene, as necessary, to protect the people’s
rights against legislative overreaching, lest it act illegally itself. And
there was nothing in such a theory to suggest deference to the
legislature, a doubtful case rule. Or, if there was, it was to be developed
somewhat later (a story for another article). For the time being, the
doubtful case rule appeared not as a “corollary” of the more general
theory of judicial review, but as a pragmatic accommodation to
Americans’ lingering resistance to Iredell’s lawyerly logic.
The evidence from Iredell, therefore, suggests that there never was
a “period 2” in the history of judicial review. There was indeed a very
political history of constitutional review, forcefully told and firmly
substantiated in Kramer’s book. Then, as now, constitutional issues were
hashed out in popular and legislative politics as much as in the courts. 68
Then, as now, judicial decisions confined themselves to the rhetoric of
law even as they obviously made substantive political judgments in order
to decide cases where the law was not clear (or sometimes even when it
was). When Iredell and others worked out a compelling legal argument
for judicial review, it did not mean that politics was irrelevant to the
cases or that they thought it was. But it did mean that, contrary to
Snowiss’s claim, the history of judicial review rested on the early
establishment of a cogent legal argument for that power as an ordinary,
utterly conventional aspect of the judiciary’s obligation to expound the
law in order to decide cases—ordinary and conventional at least once
the transition from legislative to popular sovereignty was well
understood.
Neither Iredell’s writings nor most of the rest of Snowiss’s evidence
supports her claim that the early theorists of judicial review thought the
application of constitutional law categorically more political and less
judicial than the application of other sorts of law. Nothing suggests that
judicial review was any more a “substitute for revolution” than any
other exercise of governmental power was. Nor can I find any reason
to suppose that the “doubtful case” rule expressed this quasirevolutionary quality of judicial review rather than mere political

68. See, among many others in the recent spate of works on the history of constitutionalism
outside the courts, DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: D EMOCRATS AND WHIGS,
1829–1861 (2005); G ERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL D EVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN I LLINOIS (2002); K EITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
(1999); Gerald Leonard, Party as a “Political Safeguard of Federalism”: Martin Van Buren and the
Constitutional Theory of Party Politics, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 221 (2001); Gary D. Rowe,
Constitutionalism in the Streets, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 401 (2005).
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prudence or pragmatic deference to the legislature.69 Fortunately, we
now have Larry Kramer’s The People Themselves, which should be
taken generally to supplant Snowiss. Though not without its faults,
Kramer’s book is helping to launch a far more productive round of
research into the history of judicial review than we have seen in quite
some time. 70

69. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 138–52 (1893).
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